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INTRODUCTION 
Meet Trent Arsenault. By all accounts, he is a desirable bachelor:
thirty-six years old, tall, blonde, gainfully employed in Silicon
Valley, a U.S. Naval Academy graduate, and free of sexually trans-
mitted diseases (STDs).1 Like many Americans, he has his own
website where visitors can view his baby photos, read about his
hobbies and interests, and even learn about his personality traits.2
But unlike most Americans, Trent describes himself as a “donor-
sexual,” donating his sperm to couples who, either through choice or
necessity, are forgoing commercial sperm banks in their attempt to
conceive a child.3 He says he donates because “sperm donation is one
more way he can help those in his community who may be in need.”4 
Surprisingly, Trent is not all that unique, as more and more men
are willing to bypass the commercial market and donate their sperm
for free instead.5 Unlike commercial sperm banks, which are, at
least, minimally regulated by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), the free online market is currently entirely unregulated,
although many donors will agree to submit to background checks
and regular testing for STDs.6 This market for free, private sperm
donors has arisen to satisfy the demand for sperm during a time
when artificial insemination by commercial sperm has become
increasingly more expensive.7 Cost is not the only issue, however:
many individuals want their children to grow up knowing their
natural fathers, which is not possible with commercial sperm
1. See Trent’s Profile, FREE SPERM DONOR—N. CAL./S.F. BAY AREA, http://www.
web.archie.org/web/20120717041727/http://www.trentdonor.com/ (last updated June 2, 2012)
(accessed by searching www.trentdonor.com in the Internet Archive); see also Tony Dokoupil,
The Coffee Shop Baby, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 10 & 17, 2011, at 45, 48. 
2. Trent’s Profile, supra note 1. Some of his hobbies and interests include hiking, organic
food, promoting equality, and volunteering at church; he also describes himself as “[h]appy,”
“amazed by nature,” and as having a “positive outlook [on] life.” Id.
3. Dokoupil, supra note 1, at 48.
4. Rachel Lehmann-Haupt, The Underground Market of Sperm Donors, SLATE (Oct. 19,
2009, 6:40 AM), http://www.doublex.com/section/health-science/underground-market-sperm-
donors.
5. Id. 
6. E.g., id.
7. Id.
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because sperm banks require anonymity until the child is at least
eighteen years old.8 
This Note argues that free, private sperm donation serves a valu-
able societal purpose by allowing women and couples, who would
not otherwise be able to conceive a child, to have the family they
have always wanted. It does, however, raise legal issues that remain
unsettled, particularly concerning the parental rights and liabilities
of the sperm donor. It is up to either Congress or state legislatures
to provide uniform rules governing a sperm donor’s parental rights
in order to protect intended parents and sperm donors from incon-
sistent laws and legal interpretations.9 Because free, private sperm
donation and the websites that facilitate it are likely protected
under the Constitution’s penumbra of privacy rights,10 it is impera-
tive that the legal rights of all parties involved are clearly delin-
eated ahead of time to avoid potential controversies over a resulting
child. 
Moreover, this Note supports enactment by the legislature of a
default rule that removes all paternal rights and liabilities from a
private sperm donor who donates his sperm for free. This approach
would, in effect, treat him as an anonymous donor and give parental
rights to the intended parents, unless a written agreement exists to
the contrary.11 These written agreements should be presumed valid
and enforceable in all states, unless a court finds an established
parental relationship between the donor and the conceived child. 
Part I of this Note discusses the background of artificial insemi-
nation, the evolution of the fertility industry in the United States,
and the growing online market of private sperm donation. Part II
8. See infra Part II.B. 
9. See infra Part III.
10. In-depth analysis of the constitutionality of banning free, private sperm donation,
including the matching websites, is outside the scope of this Note. This Note presumes that
the government will not be able to ban private sperm donation or the websites that facilitate
it because free, private sperm donation could be considered a form of intercourse and is thus
protected from governmental interference by the “right to privacy” derived from, and protected
by, the “penumbras” of the Bill of Rights. See generally Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972) (recognizing “the rights of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965)
(“[T]he First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental
intrusion.”).
11. See infra Part IV.A.
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reviews the benefits and disadvantages of free, private sperm do-
nation, ultimately concluding that although this type of donation
serves a beneficial societal value, it has potentially devastating legal
consequences to the parties involved. Part III of this Note then dis-
cusses relevant statutes and case law concerning parental rights of
sperm donors, particularly as to how the unsettled law around these
rights may affect free, private sperm donation. Finally, Part IV
proposes solutions to the paternity issues implicated by free, private
sperm donation. 
I. BACKGROUND
In order to fully appreciate the rise in popularity of free, private
sperm donation, it is important to understand the context in which
it came about. This Part describes the history of donor-assisted
reproduction and how it has developed into a multimillion dollar
industry. This Part then explains the emergence of the free sperm
donor market and how this type of sperm donation works. 
A. History of Artificial Insemination
Infertility is a condition long recognized in our cultural heritage,
plaguing millions of women and men as a silent and irreparable
curse. In desperation, women have tried a multitude of remedies to
conceive a child, from “dr[inking] potions of mule urine and rabbit
blood [to] dous[ing] themselves with herbs believed to induce preg-
nancy.”12 Although artificial insemination (AI)13 is typically thought
of as a modern invention, some cultures were aware as early as the
third century that a woman could be impregnated without having
sexual intercourse.14 The first recorded AI of a woman occurred over
12. DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE
COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 8 (2006).
13. Artificial insemination comprises two different methods of infertility treatment: (1)
artificial insemination by a husband’s sperm (AIH), and (2) artificial insemination by donor
sperm (AID). WILFRED J. FINEGOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 17 (2d ed. 1976). When this
Note refers to AI, it is referring to artificial insemination by donor sperm. 
14. Id. at 5 (“A Talmudic story of this period [about 220 A.D.] hints that the Hebrews were
concerned about the academic possibilities of A.I.”); see also NAOMI R. CAHN, TEST TUBE
FAMILIES: WHY THE FERTILITY MARKET NEEDS LEGAL REGULATION 46 (2009) (stating that this
knowledge was available in the second century). 
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two centuries ago in 1785, when noted Scottish anatomist and
surgeon Dr. John Hunter15 reported that he had successfully insem-
inated a London woman using her husband’s sperm.16 One hundred
years later, Dr. William Pancoast performed the first AI on a
woman using donor sperm in 1884.17 AI did not begin to become
widely accepted, however, until the 1940s when a desire to repop-
ulate after World War II, advances in birth control, and a “liberal-
ization of social norms” helped increase the popularity of the
procedure.18
Most sperm banks originally began as nonprofit, in-house clinics
for the treatment of male infertility.19 Initially, these clinics used
sperm only from their patients’ husbands, storing and preserving
the deposit for future use.20 Although the market for this service
was small at first, demand grew quickly for donor sperm from
women who either had an infertile husband, a husband with a
genetic disease, or no husband at all.21 Sperm banks slowly began
to respond to this demand by accepting donations from men with no
relation to their patients, realizing in the process that there were
numerous advantages to a more “impersonal system.”22 As Professor
Debora Spar wrote in her book, The Baby Business,
By moving toward the market—soliciting donors and paying
them a nominal fee—the clinics could reduce their dependence
on their patients’ circles of friends and impose a more anony-
mous form of quality control. Using donated sperm, women (and
15. See generally WENDY MOORE, THE KNIFE MAN: THE EXTRAORDINARY LIFE AND TIMES
OF JOHN HUNTER, FATHER OF MODERN SURGERY (2005).
16. CAHN, supra note 14, at 46.
17. Id. In fact, at this time, many people believed that using donor sperm from a man
other than the woman’s husband was immoral and the woman could be accused of adultery
if she went through with the procedure. Id. Surprisingly, the first major case in the United
States in which the court ruled that AI did not constitute adultery was not until 1968. See
People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495, 498, 501-02 (Cal. 1968) (ruling that AI was not adultery
because the wife did not have sexual intercourse with the donor and, therefore, the child was
legitimate and the husband was legally responsible for the child).
18. CAHN, supra note 14, at 46-47.
19. SPAR, supra note 12, at 35-36.
20. Id. at 36.
21. Id. (“In each of these cases, sperm banking solved a problem and created a market.”).
22. Id.
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their husbands) wouldn’t actually have to choose a man to father
their child. They only had to choose his sperm.23
 
By the late 1980s, commercial sperm banks had become a com-
mon feature of the fertility landscape, with over 400 clinics in oper-
ation.24 In 1987, the federal government conducted its first and only
survey of the AI market, finding that roughly 11,000 physicians
administered AI services to nearly 172,000 women, 22 percent of
whom used commercially purchased semen.25 By 2009, commercial
sperm banks were part of a $75 million per year industry26—a re-
markable progression from the nonprofit clinics that preceded them. 
B. Sperm Donors and the Donation Process
At first, sperm donors were typically medical students, chosen for
their physical and genetic characteristics, including their “knowl-
edge of the physiology and anatomy of reproduction [which]
apprised them of the seriousness of the donor’s role in A.I.”27
Gradually, some sperm banks began specializing in providing high-
quality sperm or recruiting particular types of donors, including so-
called “genius sperm banks.”28 Others filled more unique roles by
selling primarily to lesbian couples or offering more information to
their recipients, such as photos, videos, or audio recordings of each
donor.29 
23. SPAR, supra note 12, at 36.
24. CAHN, supra note 14, at 48.
25. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., OTA-13P-BA-48, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: SUMMARY OF A 1987 SURVEY—BACKGROUND PAPER 8-9
(1988), available at http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/8804.pdf.
26. CAHN, supra note 14, at 43.
27. FINEGOLD, supra note 13, at 124; see also SPAR, supra note 12, at 37.
28. SPAR, supra note 12, at 37; David Plotz, The “Genius Babies,” and How They Grew,
SLATE (Feb. 8, 2001, 3:00 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/life/seed/2001/02/the_genius_
babies_and_how_they_grew.html. One such bank, the Repository for Germinal Choice,
claimed that it “offered only the sperm of exceptional donors, including Nobel Prize winners
and Olympic athletes.” SPAR, supra note 12, at 37. Although the Repository for Germinal
Choice is now closed, Plotz, supra, several traditional sperm banks now allow users to search
their donor databases by educational achievement or profession of the donor. See, e.g.,
FAIRFAX CRYOBANK, http://donorsearch.fairfaxcryobank.com (last visited Feb. 28, 2013). 
29. SPAR, supra note 12, at 37; see also PAC. REPROD. SERVICES, http://www. pacrepro.com/
(last visited Feb. 28, 2013) (touting themselves as “[t]he most experienced sperm bank and
insemination services for lesbian couples”); XYTEX CRYO INT’L, http://www.xytex.com (last
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Reimbursement for sperm donation varies widely among clinics
due to the lack of a set standard for reasonable compensation. For
example, the Northwest Cryobank, located in Spokane, Washington,
advertises on its website that sperm donors can earn as much as
$1,000 a month for donating,30 whereas the California Cryobank,
located in Los Angeles, California, reimburses donors up to $1,200
a month with additional incentives such as movie tickets or gift cer-
tificates to those participants who expend “extra time and effort.”31
Generally though, men make between $50 and $100 per donation.32 
C. Defining Free, Private Sperm Donation
The Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) industry is con-
stantly evolving and expanding.33 Roughly one in six couples expe-
rience infertility in the process of starting a family and must seek
medical treatment.34 And as the number of alternative-lifestyle
families rises, so will the need for assisted reproductive services by
couples who cannot procreate naturally. Although sperm banks con-
tinue to be a valuable resource for couples experiencing male infer-
tility, many people have begun to look elsewhere for sperm. 
Recently, a new online market of free sperm donors has emerged
for married heterosexual couples, gay35 and lesbian couples, and
single women unable to conceive children naturally. This market in-
cludes advertisements on Craigslist,36 Yahoo Groups,37 and websites
visited Feb. 28, 2013) (providing photos and audio files of donors).
30. Sperm Donation, NWCRYOBANK, https://www.nwcryobank.com/sperm-donation (last
visited Feb. 28, 2013). 
31. California Cryobank Sperm Donor Compensation, CAL. CRYOBANK, https://spermbank.
com/cd_secure/newdonors/index.cfm?ID=4 (last visited Feb. 28, 2013).
32. Rene Almeling, Selling Genes, Selling Gender: Egg Agencies, Sperm Banks, and the
Medical Market in Genetic Material, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 319, 320 (2007).
33. Congress has defined ART as “all treatments or procedures which include the
handling of human oocytes or embryos, including in vitro fertilization, gamete intrafallopian
transfer, zygote intrafallopian transfer, and other specific technologies.” Fertility Clinic
Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 263a-7 (2006). 
34. Ruth Deech, The HFEA—10 Years On, in THE REGULATION OF ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 21, 27 (Jennifer Gunning & Helen Szoke eds., 2003). 
35. A gay couple would utilize AI through the use of a surrogate. 
36. See, e.g., Free Sperm Donation, CRAIGSLIST, http://montana.craigslist.org/m4w/
3185327485.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2012) (on file with author). 
37. The Free Sperm Donors Group, YAHOO! GROUPS, http://health.groups.yahoo.com/
group/FreeSpermDonors (last visited Feb. 28, 2013). This group later became the Known
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such as Sperm Donors Worldwide.38 Unlike traditional sperm banks,
these matching websites are entirely unregulated,39 men do not
receive compensation for their donations, and donors generally
allow potential offspring to contact them.40 Despite the lack of
regulation, many donors agree to undergo STD testing, submit to
background checks, and relinquish any paternal rights they have
over conceived children.41 
Beth Gardner, who became a fervent believer in the strategy
while seeking free sperm online, launched the Known Donor
Registry (KDR), formerly the Free Sperm Donor Registry.42 KDR is
a private sperm donor registry that allows donors and recipients to
create online profiles; recipients then can search for a donor with
desired characteristics.43 Members control the amount of informa-
tion that they share with different groups of users and can be con-
tacted only through a secure form.44 It is a kind of “moderated
Craigslist,”45 functioning like a dating site, but the women are listed
as “recipients,” and the men are listed as “donors.”46 Currently, KDR
boasts more than 8,000 members, including roughly 400 donors, and
claims to have facilitated a dozen pregnancies.47 Most of KDR’s
users are lesbian couples or single women, but there is an active
contingent of heterosexual couples as well.48 KDR allows donors to
give sperm through AI or Natural Insemination (NI), although it
prefers donation through AI.49 It also “prohibits nudity, dirty talk,
cruising for casual sex, and any behavior that other members deem
Donor Registry. See Dokoupil, supra note 1, at 46.
38. SPERM DONORS WORLDWIDE, http://www.sperm-donors-worldwide.com (last visited
Feb. 28, 2013). This service also goes by the names FIDW and DIY Baby.
39. Lehmann-Haupt, supra note 4. 
40. See Dokoupil, supra note 1, at 46.
41. Id.
42. Id.; About Known Donor Registry, KNOWN DONOR REGISTRY, http://www.known
donorregistry.com/aboutkdr (last visited Feb. 28, 2013).
43. About Known Donor Registry, supra note 42.
44. Id. 
45. J. Bryan Lowder, Is Free, Private Sperm Donation a Good Idea?, SLATE (Oct. 4, 2011,
3:18 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2011/10/04/is_free_private_sperm_donation_
a_good_idea_.html.
46. Dokoupil, supra note 1, at 46.
47. Id.; About Known Donor Registry, supra note 42.
48. Dokoupil, supra note 1, at 47.
49. About Known Donor Registry, supra note 42.
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harassing.”50 KDR discourages anonymity, believing it is important
that children be able to contact their biological fathers and potential
siblings conceived using the same donor.51 Additionally, in order to
help recipients make informed choices, KDR provides testimonials,
how-to articles, cost comparisons, and legal materials on the site.52 
Another matching website is Sperm Donors Worldwide, a mod-
erated, members-only service that enforces a strict “Behaviour
Code” among its members in an attempt to ensure more genuine,
safe, and responsible sperm donations.53 Created in 2003, the site
boasts that it is the sole sperm donation website to accept only AI
donors—as opposed to NI donors—in order to reduce health risks
and maintain emotional boundaries; it also does not allow donors to
charge for their donations.54 Like KDR, the founders of Sperm
Donors Worldwide believe that donor-conceived children have a
right to information about their biological origins and do not allow
for anonymous donations to be offered or requested.55 It also sells
self-insemination kits for $30, which further reduces the cost
associated with traditional AI by removing the need for a doctor to
perform the procedure.56 
Once a donor and potential recipient are matched, many donors
submit to STD testing, interviews, reference checks, and additional
questions the recipient may have before the insemination takes
place.57 Next, the parties schedule a time to meet to “transfer” the
sample.58 Venues can include anywhere from a hotel room to a
Starbucks bathroom.59 If the recipient is performing self-insemina-
tion, the donor will ejaculate in private and then hand the specimen
over to the recipient, who then attaches the sperm-filled cup to her
50. Dokoupil, supra note 1, at 48.
51. About Known Donor Registry, supra note 42.
52. Id. There are also plans to expand the site to include an egg donor section as well.
Dokoupil, supra note 1, at 48. 
53. SPERM DONORS WORLDWIDE, supra note 38.
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Dokoupil, supra note 1, at 46.
58. Id. 
59. Id.
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cervix as soon as possible, because fresh sperm is only viable outside
the body for a couple of hours.60 
II. SOCIETAL VALUE OF FREE, PRIVATE SPERM DONATION
A number of factors associated with AI using commercial sperm
have contributed to the rise of free, private sperm donation as a
viable alternative: the high cost of commercial sperm, the anonym-
ity of commercial sperm donation, health concerns arising from
minimal regulation of commercial sperm banks, and the lack of
availability of commercial sperm to all potential recipients. This
Part will examine these factors, ultimately concluding that free,
private sperm donation provides a beneficial service to society.
A. Cost
The Supreme Court has described in dictum the right to procreate
as “one of the basic civil rights of man.”61 But for millions of
Americans, conceiving a child naturally is impossible. Fortunately,
modern medicine has developed numerous “artificial” alternatives
for people to have children. Commercially and medically, AI is a
simple and straightforward way to confront male infertility.62
However, AI with commercial sperm has become an exclusive and,
in some cases, cost-prohibitive method of conception. A single vial
of sperm can cost $700,63 and, depending on insurance coverage,
each round of AI performed by a doctor can cost over $1,000, with
women typically needing to undergo numerous rounds of insemina-
tion before it is successful.64 
Cost, therefore, is one major factor contributing to the rise of free,
private sperm donation. In many states, insurance does not cover
60. ANNETTE BARAN & REUBEN PANNOR, LETHAL SECRETS: THE SHOCKING CONSEQUENCES
AND UNSOLVED PROBLEMS OF ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 137 (1989) (“[F]resh sperm, to be
effective, must be inseminated within two hours of ejaculation.”).
61. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
62. SPAR, supra note 12, at 37.
63. The California Cryobank, for example, charges up to $650 for vials of anonymous
donor samples and up to $750 for open donor samples. See Pricing, CAL. CRYOBANK,
http://www.cryobank.com/services/pricing (last updated Jan. 2013).
64. Lehmann-Haupt, supra note 4.
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infertility treatment;65 in those states that do cover it, many require
women to show that they have not been able to get pregnant
naturally, making it difficult for nonmarried and lesbian couples to
receive coverage.66 Expanding insurance coverage of fertility treat-
ments would still exclude most Medicaid recipients and millions of
uninsured Americans; this is especially troubling since lower-income
women are more likely to suffer from infertility than those in the
middle class.67 Even if insemination is covered, insurance caps can
still result in thousands of dollars in out-of-pocket costs.68 These
costs show no signs of decreasing. For example, in order for a sperm
bank to break even, it must sell roughly 10,000 units a year, which
is difficult for smaller banks to maintain.69 As these financial pres-
sures mount, the sperm industry is likely to respond by raising
prices on its reproductive services, effectively closing the market to
more and more individuals. Consequently, it is not surprising that
the availability of zero-to-no-cost insemination alternatives has
prompted the growth of the online market of free sperm donation.
This is not to say that the commercialization of sperm donation
has no societal value. Compensation is no doubt a large motivator
for sperm donors in the United States,70 where the donor pool is still
large and donors can make up to $12,000 a year from their anony-
mous donations.71 If compensation were removed, the potential
shortage in samples could lead to dramatic increases in the cost of
commercial sperm, meaning that even fewer women would be able
to conceive children through AI. Charging recipients for sperm is
also necessary due to the high costs associated with running a
sperm bank, such as conducting health screening tests, reimbursing
65. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-22-1521(3)(b)(xii) (2011) (excluding artificial insemi-
nation or treatment for infertility in the required services covered by an association plan). 
66. Dokoupil, supra note 1, at 47. For example, Maryland defines infertility for purposes
of health insurance as a condition in which the patient or spouse has a history of infertility
for at least two years, and it must be caused by one of the listed medical conditions. MD. CODE
ANN., INS. § 15-810(c) (West 2012). 
67. JANNA C. MERRICK & ROBERT H. BLANK, REPRODUCTIVE ISSUES IN AMERICA 54-55
(2003). 
68. Dokoupil, supra note 1, at 47.
69. SPAR, supra note 12, at 39.
70. Merrick and Blank described one sperm donor as saying, “I did not [donate sperm] to
get fifty cards on Father’s Day; I did it for the money.” MERRICK & BLANK, supra note 67, at
53.
71. Dokoupil, supra note 1, at 47.
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donors, and collecting and storing sperm samples, along with other
administrative expenses.72
Thus, this Note does not argue that the United States should for-
bid sperm banks from compensating donors or receiving payment in
exchange for sperm samples; it merely suggests that there is a need
for and value in enabling women to receive AI through private
donation. Free, private sperm donation provides an attractive alter-
native to commercial sperm banks for those who cannot afford to
use commercial sperm.
B. Issues Related to Anonymity
Unlike commercial sperm banks, websites that facilitate free,
private sperm donation encourage donors to reveal their identities.
Most private donors are willing to disclose personal information
immediately to potential recipients and maintain limited contact
with children they help conceive.73 This is partly due to the fact that
many women want their children to know their biological fathers.74
In stark contrast to the open-disclosure culture of free, private
sperm donation, commercial sperm donation is rooted in secrecy.
Children conceived through sperm from anonymous donors have
also expressed their dissatisfaction with the “closed-door policy” of
commercial sperm banks,75 as evidenced by websites such as
Confessions of a Cryokid76 and Anonymous Us,77 where donor-
conceived children can voice their unhappiness at feeling “half-
adopted.”78 Studies indicate that “some donor children experience a
72. Cf. SPAR, supra note 12, at 39.
73. Dokoupil, supra note 1, at 46. 
74. See id.
75. Id. at 47.
76. CONFESSIONS OF A CRYOKID, http://cryokidconfessions.blogspot.com (last visited Feb.
28, 2013).
77. THE ANONYMOUS US PROJECT, http://anonymousus.org (last visited Feb. 28, 2013).
78. Dokoupil, supra note 1, at 47. In response to the growing frustration with anonymity,
the Donor Sibling Registry website was created in 2000 in order to provide a forum for donor
offspring to find and contact their biological relatives. DONOR SIBLING REGISTRY,
https://www.donorsiblingregistry.com (last visited Feb. 28, 2013). The site currently boasts
a membership of nearly 38,000 people, averages more than 10,000 visitors each month, and
has helped to connect over 9500 “half-siblings and/or donors.” Id.
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sense of loss” from not knowing who their biological fathers are or
being able to form relationships with them.79
Anonymity originally stemmed from the desire to avoid “the
shame of infertility.”80 Today, the primary arguments against iden-
tity disclosure derive from concerns about the supply of donors and
their right to privacy. Sperm banks believe that if donors are not
anonymous, men will refuse to donate due to fear of potential
parental obligations or unwanted relationships later.81 This worry
may be unfounded, however. For example, in 1984, Sweden enacted
legislation that mandated the release of a donor’s identity once a
child conceived by AI reached eighteen years of age.82 Although the
legislation raised concerns that the law would cause a severe decline
in the supply of sperm donors,83 the number of donations subse-
quently increased.84 This same result occurred after New Zealand
passed similar legislation.85 Thus, although removing anonymity
may at first have a negative impact on the number of sperm donors,
the predictions of sweeping shortages in supply appear overstated. 
Additionally, sperm banks have recently been under fire for their
policies requiring anonymity until the child reaches the age of eigh-
teen due to genetic diseases that have been passed from sperm
donor to child. ABC News identified at least twenty-four children
conceived with sperm from a donor who had a rare heart defect that,
if inherited, could potentially kill his offspring without warning.86
There have been lawsuits against sperm banks for “faulty” sperm
acquired anonymously. In Johnson v. Superior Court, a family
79. Naomi Cahn, Reproducing Dreams, in BABY MARKETS: MONEY AND THE NEW POLITICS
OF CHEATING FAMILIES 147, 153 (Michele Bratcher Goodwin ed., 2010). 
80. CAHN, supra note 14, at 223.
81. See, e.g., Dokoupil, supra note 1, at 47. 
82. LAG OM INSEMINATION (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 1984:1140) (Swed.). Since
Sweden first enacted its law, Austria, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Norway, the
Netherlands, and parts of Australia have abolished anonymity. See Lisa M. Luetkemeyer,
Who’s Guarding the Henhouse and What Are They Doing with the Eggs (and Sperm)? A Call
for Increased Regulation of Gamete Donation and Long-Term Tracking of Donor Gametes, 3
ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 397, 406 (2010).
83. CAHN, supra note 14, at 227.
84. Id. 
85. Id.
86. Susan Donaldson James, Sperm Donor’s 24 Kids Never Told About Fatal Illness, ABC
NEWS (July 21, 2011, 2:02 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/sperm-donors-24-children-told-
fatal-illness-medical/story?id=14115344.
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alleged that the sperm bank failed to tell them that their donor had
a family history of kidney disease.87 The court decided that the state
interest outweighed the donor’s right to privacy and ordered the
sperm bank to turn over the donor’s medical records.88 Currently,
only eighteen states have enacted legislation allowing a child con-
ceived through an anonymous sperm donation to access donor
records upon a showing of “good cause,”89 a very ambiguous stan-
dard that remains relatively untested in the courts. The anonymity
of donors, coupled with the lack of long-term record keeping and
follow-up requirements, makes it difficult for sperm banks to warn
families of flawed sperm and increases the likelihood that this
sperm will continue to be sold even after problems arise.
Related to the issue of hereditary diseases is the potential for
accidental incest resulting from the anonymity of donors. The New
York Times reported sperm banks creating 150-child clusters
around a single donor.90 Many other countries, including England,
Belgium, and Sweden, limit how many children a sperm donor can
father in order to avoid accidental consanguineous conceptions.91
The United States, however, has no such laws and instead merely
has guidelines that the American Society for Reproduction Medicine
(ASRM) issues, which recommend restricting conceptions by indiv-
idual donors to 25 births per population of 800,000—a recommenda-
tion that is not enforced by law, has no tracking system in place,
and does not require mothers of donor-conceived children to report
their children’s births.92 Individual sperm banks may have policies
87. 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 867-68 (Ct. App. 2000). 
88. Id. at 878.
89. Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Adoption, Reproductive Technologies, and Genetic
Information, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 125, 138 (1998); see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-106(1)
(West 2012) (stating that donor records may be accessed “only upon an order of the court for
good cause shown”). 
90. Jacqueline Mroz, One Sperm Donor, 150 Offspring, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2011), http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/09/06/health/06donor.html.
91. For example, England currently limits donors to ten families. See Donor Recruitment,
Assessment, and Screening, HUMAN FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITY, http://www.
hfea.gov.uk/498.html?fldSearchFor=donor%20limits#guidanceSection705011.3(i) (last visited
Feb. 28, 2013).
92. AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GAMETE AND EMBRYO
DONATION: A COMMITTEE OPINION 7 (2012), available at http://www.sart.org/uploadedFiles/
ASRM_Content/News_and_Publications/Practice_Guidelines/Guidelines_and_Minimum_S
tandards/2008_Guidelines_for_gamete(1).pdf. 
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in place to limit the number of children conceived per sperm donor,
but the numbers vary wildly. For example, the Rainbow Flag Health
Services sperm bank limits each donor to have children by only four
to six different women;93 other sperm banks allow a donor to
produce children with ten different women;94 still others have no
limit at all.95
Although private donors, like their commercial counterparts, are
not subject to legal limits on the number of offspring they can
father, many of the free sperm donor websites keep track of the
number of children each donor produces.96 Because the donations
are not anonymous, the information is more readily available to
potential recipients. If these websites continue to gain popularity,
it will be important for them to establish a formal registry that lists
the number of children per donor, along with their geographic
locations, to help avoid possible cases of incest and to help prevent
the spread of genetic diseases among donor children by providing
information as to where other related donor-conceived children live. 
Some sperm banks have responded to the increased demand for
less anonymity by offering sperm from “known” donors, usually at
a steeper price.97 For example, Rainbow Flag Health Services in
Alameda, California promises potential clients that “your child will
grow up without secrets. They will not grow up fantasizing that
their ‘father’ is the lost King of Bavaria or Charles Manson.”98 This
system of disclosure, however, is far from perfect: banks can choose
any kind of identity-release policies they like, but outside of contract
law, these programs are not bound by any legal obligations, and
donors are not required to provide even their real names or updated
medical information.99 To complicate matters further, even if a
commercial sperm bank donor has allowed a child to contact him, a
93. See RAINBOW FLAG HEALTH SERVICES, http://www.gayspermbank.com/ (last visited
Feb. 28, 2013).
94. See, e.g., FAQs, SPERM BANK OF CAL., https://www.thespermbankofca.org/ content/faqs
(last visited Feb. 28, 2013). 
95. RAINBOW FLAG HEALTH SERVICES, supra note 93.
96. See KNOWN DONOR REGISTRY, http://www.knowndonorregistry.com (last visited Feb.
28, 2013).
97. See Pricing, supra note 63.
98. RAINBOW FLAG HEALTH SERVICES, supra note 93. Another sperm bank, Xytex Cryo
International, provides its clients with photos and the names of their donors. XYTEX CRYO
INT’L, supra note 29. 
99. CAHN, supra note 14, at 121. 
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high likelihood exists that the child will never be able to find the
donor because banks may keep records of their donations for only a
limited number of years.100 
Ultimately, participants in AI need to have identifying informa-
tion about one another. It is in the child’s best interests to know the
identity of his or her genetic parents.101 This need for genealogical
and historical connections is the same for all people, no matter how
one was conceived. Even the field of adoption, which once encour-
aged anonymity much like sperm donation, has begun to favor dis-
closure. Now, many adoptions are considered “open,” meaning that
the birth parents are known to the infant from the time that they
are born but are not considered legal parents.102 In response to con-
cerns about children’s needs, six states have gone so far as to pass
disclosure laws for adoptees, and several others employ registries
that allow adoptees to obtain nonidentifying information about their
birth parents.103 Children conceived with donor sperm have much of
the same needs as adopted children: both groups need information
on potential genetic health risks, and both have a psychological need
to know where they came from. 
C. Health Concerns
One of the strongest criticisms of free, private sperm donation is
the lack of any regulation requiring health screenings of the donor
and his sperm before the insemination occurs. Because infertility
treatments have a substantial medical component, many people
believe that the industry seems like a natural candidate for compre-
hensive government oversight. In many parts of the world, such
oversight is already in place.104 But in the United States, federal
100. See id. at 23.
101. See id. at 151 (“States should guarantee the release of [identifying information] to
mature adults through laws that would preempt private agreements.”). 
102. Id. at 122. 
103. Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the
Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 891 & n.261 (2000).
104. The United Kingdom is one example of a country taking a more centralized regulatory
approach to licensing and monitoring its infertility market. The Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act of 1990 (HFEA) sets standards to govern AI and assisted reproductive
technologies and establishes a governmental agency to regulate ART providers and resolve
legal issues through administrative rule making. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act,
1990, c. 37 (Eng.).
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regulation of ART is confined to a single piece of legislation—the
Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992—which
lacks meaningful enforcement mechanisms.105 Professional organi-
zations such as the American Fertility Society have promulgated
standards of practice for assisted reproductive facilities, which,
while valuable, do not have the force of law.106 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) did not impose any
requirements on sperm banks until 2005. Because sperm banks deal
with biological tissue, they are now regulated as human cell, tissue,
and cellular and tissue-based product (HCT/P) establishments and
are thus subject to FDA oversight.107 Pursuant to section 361 of the
Public Health Services Act (PHS Act), the FDA requires that HCT/P
businesses register with the FDA, list all HCT/P’s under the estab-
lishment’s control, and screen and test donors for communicable
diseases such as HIV, Hepatitis B and C, and other sexually trans-
mitted diseases.108 However, the FDA does not require screening for
genetic diseases.109 Unfortunately, clinics dealing with reproductive
tissue, such as sperm banks, are exempt from complying with re-
quirements to track tissue or report adverse medical reactions,110
and they are only required to maintain screening and test results
for each donor for ten years.111 
The PHS Act differentiates among three categories of reproduc-
tive donors—anonymous, directed,112 and sexually intimate partners
105. See Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 263a-1
(2006); see also Luetkemeyer, supra note 82, at 407-08. The Act requires that all ART
programs and clinics provide success rates annually to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC),
although there are no meaningful consequences for failing to report this data. Id. at 408. It
also compels the CDC to develop a model certification program for embryo laboratories to be
implemented by interested states, although participation is purely voluntary and, to date, no
state has adopted the program. Id.
106. MERRICK & BLANK, supra note 67, at 50. 
107. Luetkemeyer, supra note 82, at 409.
108. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.1 (2012). It should be noted that the FDA’s requirements are the
minimum requirements mandated by the federal government; some states may have
requirements that are more rigorous than these, such as sperm bank licensing mandates. AM.
SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., supra note 92, at 1. 
109. AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., supra note 92, at 1. 
110. Luetkemeyer, supra note 82, at 409-10. 
111. AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., supra note 92, at 7. 
112. A directed reproductive donor is defined as “a donor of reproductive cells or tissue
... to a specific recipient, and who knows and is known by the recipient before donation.
The term ... does not include a sexually intimate partner under § 1271.90.” 21 C.F.R.
2013] DEFINING PATERNITY 1733
—subjecting each category to a different set of requirements before
the sperm can be used.113 Only anonymous donor sperm is required
to undergo all relevant donor-eligibility screening and testing re-
quirements.114 Directed reproductive donors, or known donors, may
contribute sperm under certain circumstances even if their sperm
is considered ineligible after screening.115 Their sperm is also ex-
empted from the quarantine and six-month retesting requirements
applicable to anonymous donations.116 For sexually intimate part-
ners, no testing or screening procedures are required.117 A free, pri-
vate sperm donor would most likely be considered a known donor
under this regulatory scheme because the recipient has a chance to
meet with the potential donor face-to-face, and therefore would not
have to undergo extensive testing if both parties went through a
fertility clinic. 
Acquiring anonymous donor sperm through a commercial sperm
bank is like a “roll of the genetic dice”118 because no federal law
requires that sperm banks screen for genetic diseases, despite the
recommendation by the ASRM that banks test donors for certain
genetic conditions when the donor has a family history of the dis-
ease.119 As a result, hundreds of women have bought sperm carrying
an array of serious diseases and genetic disorders.120 In one case, a
woman who was artificially inseminated with donor sperm gave
§ 1271.3. 
113. Id. § 1271.90. 
114. See id. Anonymous sperm donors must pass all screening and tests required under
sections 1271.75 and 1271.80. A new test specimen from these donors must be collected at
least six months after their semen donation, and it must test negative for communicable
diseases in order for the sperm donation to be eligible. The donation is quarantined until this
retesting is complete. Id. § 1271.60(a). 
115. Id. § 1271.90(a)(3). 
116. Id. § 1271.85(d); AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., supra note 92, at 7. 
117. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.90(a)(2). 
118. Jacqueline Mroz, In Choosing a Sperm Donor, a Roll of the Genetic Dice, N.Y. TIMES
(May 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/15/health/in-sperm-banks-a-matrix-of-
untested-genetic-diseases.html.
119. Id. Many banks, however, do go further than the FDA regulations and self-regulate
by placing additional limits and rules on themselves. For example, the California Cryobank
claims that its “strict donor qualification process eliminates over 99% of all applicants” and
includes “[h]igh educational and physical standards, personal and family medical histories,
multiple semen and blood analyses, genetic screening, and a series of extensive interviews.”
Donor Selection, CAL. CRYOBANK, http://www.cryobank.com/why-use-us/donor-selection (last
visited Feb. 28, 2013). 
120. Dokoupil, supra note 1, at 47.
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birth to a child with cystic fibrosis, despite the assertion on the
laboratory’s website that all donors were tested for genetic condi-
tions.121 And the fact that commercial sperm donors can father a
large number of children increases the chance that genetic condi-
tions will be prevalent in the general population.122 
Due to the lack of complete and uniform regulations, enforcement,
and mandatory compliance, there are numerous health risks asso-
ciated with sperm acquired through commercial sperm banks,
despite additional STD and genetic testing that may be performed
on each donation. As Sean Tipton, director of public affairs for the
ASRM, has stated, “Human reproduction is an inherently risky
proposition and it always will be, so it’s impossible to remove all the
risk and uncertainty of reproducing .... You’ll never be able to catch
everything.”123 Although free, private sperm donation is unregu-
lated, the recipient can request that the donor complete STD and
other medical tests, which can yield the same, or even higher,
quality sperm as a sperm bank, but at a much lower cost. 
D. Availability 
ART is not available to everyone. Many gay and lesbian couples
face tremendous difficulty in obtaining fertility services, even if they
have the money to pay for it. The free market system in which fer-
tility clinics operate often excludes these couples. Many clinics use
a variety of criteria to screen patients, including an “appropriate-
ness for parenthood” standard determined by what the clinic deems
to be in the best interest of the child.124 This “clinical gatekeeping”
may exclude nontraditional families, such as single women or gay
and lesbian couples.125 According to a 2001 study, only 79 percent of
ART clinics would provide services to unmarried women, and 74
percent would provide to lesbian couples.126 Single men or gay
121. Mroz, supra note 118.
122. Dokoupil, supra note 1, at 47.
123. Mroz, supra note 118 (internal quotation marks omitted).
124. CAHN, supra note 14, at 135.
125. Id. 
126. CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHONOLOGY: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 29 (2d ed. 2011) (citing
Judy E. Stern et al., Access to Services at Assisted Reproductive Technology Clinics, 184 AM.
J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 591 (2001)).
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couples would likely encounter even more obstacles in obtaining
these services.127 
III. LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING FREE, PRIVATE SPERM DONATION
Advances in reproductive technology have made it possible for
both traditional128 and nontraditional families who otherwise would
be childless to be parents. The law, however, has not developed in
tandem with these medical advances and changing social circum-
stances, creating novel legal issues concerning parental rights and
the status of “artificially” conceived children. This Part outlines the
current federal and state statutes and case law concerning paternity
as it relates to donor-conceived children and describes how inconsis-
tencies in the law have important legal implications for artificial
insemination with free, private donor sperm.
A. Paternity
1. Legal Landscape
Historically, legal fatherhood depended on whether the biological
father was married to the mother;129 only through marriage was a
father thought to have “recognized his responsibility toward his
children.”130 Often, the law deprived unwed natural fathers of pater-
nity rights unless they lived with or developed bonds with their
child.131 Early cases dealing with families formed through artificial
insemination struggled with whether the children were “legitimate”
or whether the mother had committed adultery.132 Modern courts
are less concerned with the legitimacy of the resulting child and
more concerned with defining the rights of the sperm, egg, or gam-
ete providers.133
127. Id.
128. A “traditional family” in the context of American family law refers to two married
heterosexual adults who may have their own biological children or who have adopted children.
Id. at 5. 
129. ROSEMARIE SKAINE, PATERNITY AND AMERICAN LAW 35 (2003).
130. Id. 
131. See id. at 36. 
132. See supra note 17. 
133. CAHN, supra note 14, at 74.
1736 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1715
Under the United States’ system of federalism, family law re-
mains the domain of the states through their authority to protect
health and regulate familial relations, medical practice, and con-
tracts; thus, each state can develop its own set of laws to govern
family law issues.134 Consequently, no one federal law determines
legal parentage, and, instead, states have enacted an array of laws
that address issues dealing with AI: some limit who can use AI,135
whereas others broaden the scope of individuals protected under AI-
related statutes.136 AI regulation has grown in a piecemeal and
inconsistent fashion, as state legislatures and courts shape their
own responses to new technologies and the legal issues associated
with reproduction as legal conflicts arise.137
The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) is the closest the United States
has come to creating a uniform set of rules governing AI and the
parentage issues surrounding it.138 The UPA is a model statute and
may be adopted by state legislatures on a state-by-state basis.139 As
first promulgated in 1973, the UPA contained a section dealing with
the use of AI by married couples.140 The Act provided that if a wife
was artificially inseminated with donor semen under a physician’s
supervision, the husband gave his written consent, and the physi-
cian filed this consent with the state health department, then the
husband, not the donor, was treated as if he were the natural father
of the conceived child for legal purposes.141 
By 1998, thirty states had adopted the UPA or something similar,
with fifteen states eliminating the licensed physician require-
134. SUSAN L. CROCKIN & HOWARD W. JONES, JR., LEGAL CONCEPTIONS: THE EVOLVING LAW
AND POLICY OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 134 (2010); MERRICK & BLANK, supra
note 67, at 50. 
135. For example, Oklahoma prohibits the use of AI by anyone but married, heterosexual
couples. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 553 (West 2012). Georgia makes it a felony for anyone
other than a licensed physician to perform AI. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-34-37, -42 (2012). 
136. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.239 (West 2012) (stating that the sperm donor is
not considered the legal father of any child born through artificial insemination if he is not
the mother’s husband); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A.
355 (2001) (recognizing the interests of single people in using artificial reproductive
technology).
137. MERRICK & BLANK, supra note 67, at 49; Luetkemeyer, supra note 82, at 407.
138. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (repealed 2000), 9B U.L.A. 407 (2001).
139. CAHN, supra note 14, at 83, 85.
140. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5.
141. See id.
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ment.142 The Act, when initially created, had several shortcomings,
however. It did not address potential legal issues concerning the
rights of a divorced father, the standing of nonmarital fathers to sue
for parental rights, or the parental status of sperm donors when the
recipient was unmarried or was not inseminated by a licensed phy-
sician; nor did it address surrogacy and gestational agreements.143
Ultimately, the Act applied only for children conceived through AI
performed by a licensed physician on a married woman.144
The revised Uniform Parentage Act of 2000 clarified the legal
parentage question that the first passage of the Act left unresolved.
The updated UPA modernized itself by maintaining a gender-
neutral stance on donation.145 In addition, the language referencing
married women and licensed physicians was removed in order to
“provide[ ] certainty of nonparentage for prospective donors.”146
Unlike the former UPA, the language of the new UPA defines the
rights of not only single women but also of unmarried heterosexual
couples, whether or not those couples are intimately involved, so as
to “reflect[ ] the concern for the best interests of nonmarital as well
as marital children of assisted reproduction.”147 As for sperm dona-
tion, a donor is not a legal parent if conception occurred through AI
and he did not intend to become a parent.148 However, the revised
Act still allows a donor to contest paternity if he can prove that he
lived with the child within the first two years of the child’s life and
considered the child his offspring.149 Despite the modernization of
the Act and its clarification of several parentage issues, as of 2012,
only nine states had incorporated a version of the revised UPA into
their own state statutes concerning parentage.150
142. Garrison, supra note 103, at 845-46.
143. CAHN, supra note 14, at 85-86.
144. Id.
145. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt. (updated 2011), 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001).
146. Id. (“The donor can neither sue to establish parental rights, nor be sued and required
to support the resulting child. In sum, donors are eliminated from the parental equation.”).
147. See id. § 703 cmt.
148. See id. §§ 702-703. 
149. Id. § 704.
150. These states include Alabama, Delaware, North Dakota, Oklahoma, New Mexico,
Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming; however, none have enacted the law verbatim. See
Enactment Status Map, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=
Parentage%20Act (last visited Feb. 28, 2013).
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States have taken three different approaches when defining
parental rights of sperm donors: some states have adopted statutes
comparable to the 1973 UPA, providing that donors whose sperm is
given to a physician for inseminating a married woman are not legal
parents;151 other states have laws similar to the revised 2000 UPA,
which provide a gender-neutral intent and effect by specifying that
no donor will be considered a parent, regardless of the marital
status of the parties;152 and finally, some states do not have a stat-
ute specifically concerning the parental status of sperm donors.153 
Adding to the divergence of laws on this issue, even when a state
has a statute on point, courts have occasionally disregarded the
statute and applied an intent-based analysis or looked to parentage
agreements when determining parental rights.154 For example, in
T.M.H. v. D.M.T., the biological mother of a child, who donated her
egg to her lesbian partner (and birth mother of the child), brought
an action against the birth mother requesting a determination of
parentage.155 The biological mother challenged the constitutionality
of Florida’s state parentage statute that provided, “[t]he donor of
any egg, sperm, or preembryo … shall relinquish all maternal or
151. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.20.045 (West 2012) (providing that “[a] child born
to a married woman by means of artificial insemination performed by a licensed physician and
consented to in writing by both spouses, is considered for all purposes the natural and
legitimate child of both spouses” and not that of the donor); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a) (West
2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West 2012).
152. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-106(2), (3) (West 2012) (“A donor is not a parent
of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction, except as provided in subsection (3)
of this section.... If a husband ... consents to, assisted reproduction by his wife as provided in
subsection (1) of this section, he is the father of the resulting child.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-
5405(1) (West 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1114(f) (West 1995) (stating that the default rule
is that a sperm donor has no paternal rights, even if he is known to the mother, unless he and
the mother have agreed otherwise in writing). 
153. This includes about one-third of states: Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New York, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia. See Enactment Status Map,
supra note 150.
154. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 679 (Cal. 2005) (holding that a lesbian woman
who provided her ova to her lesbian partner was not a “donor” of her ova, because “K.M. did
not intend to simply donate her ova to E.G., but rather provided her ova to her lesbian partner
with whom she was living so that E.G. could give birth to a child that would be raised in their
joint home”); In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) (refusing to apply statutory
protection of recipient because parties had an oral agreement that donor’s parental rights
would be preserved). But see CAHN, supra note 14, at 89-90 (describing how courts sometimes
refuse to apply parental agreements).
155. 79 So. 3d 787, 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
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paternal rights and obligations with respect to the donation or the
resulting children.”156 The court held that the statute violated her
constitutionally protected parental rights to the child and granted
parental rights to both women.157
2. Application of Paternity Laws to Commercial Sperm    
Donation
Paternity is generally not an issue when a married woman uses
an  anonymous donor’s sperm and a licensed physician performs the
insemination. Most states have laws that remove paternal rights
from anonymous sperm donors and give them to the intended
parents.158 Moreover, anonymous sperm donors who donate to sperm
banks sign donor consent agreements that relinquish any parental
rights to a resulting child.159 
Complications arise, however, when the woman knows the donor
or is not married. Courts will generally grant sole rights to a woman
who has complied with her state’s AI laws, but most of these stat-
utes do not protect unmarried women or do not apply when a lic-
ensed physician is not involved.160 In construing these provisions,
some courts have declined to protect single women trying to combat
donor assertions of paternity due to public policy concerns about
single parenthood.161 As will be discussed below, a woman or couple
156. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.14 (West 2012). 
157. T.M.H., 79 So. 3d at 803. 
158. See CAHN, supra note 14, at 89.
159. See, e.g., About Your Confidentiality and Anonymity, CAL. CRYOBANK, http://www.
spermbank.com/newdonors/index.cfm?ID=5 (last visited Feb. 28, 2013).
160. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
161. See, e.g., Straub v. B.T.T. ex rel. Todd, 645 N.E.2d 597, 601 (Ind. 1994) (holding that
a man did have child support responsibilities for his naturally conceived child, even though
the mother had induced him to impregnate her with a written statement releasing him from
liability); C.O. v. W.S., 64 Ohio Misc. 2d 9, 12 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1994) (“Public policy supports the
concept of legitimacy, and the concomitant rights of a child to support and inheritance.... A
father’s voluntary assumption of fiscal responsibility for his child should be endorsed as a
socially responsible action.” (citations omitted)); Estes v. Albers, 504 N.W.2d 607, 609 (S.D.
1993) (holding that the state’s AI statute was not followed when a man helped a woman
conceive a child naturally after agreeing with her that he would not have child support
obligations, and therefore found that the man did have parental rights). But see Steven S. v.
Deborah D., 127 Cal. App. 4th 319 (2005) (holding that the state statute providing that sperm
donors are not natural fathers applied, despite the fact that the donor and woman had
engaged in sexual intercourse prior to the AI, because of the statute’s absolute bar). 
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who uses donor sperm from one of the private donor websites does
not have the legal protection that generally accompanies using
anonymous sperm from a commercial sperm bank; specifically, a
commercial sperm donor will not be granted parental rights over
their child. Likewise, a free, private sperm donor is also not legally
protected from claims for child support of any child he helps
conceive. 
3. Application of Paternity Laws to Private Sperm Donation
a. Failing to Comply with the Applicable Statute 
In previous cases when a known sperm donor and recipient did
not comply with their state’s statute on artificial insemination,
courts have held that the sperm donor is the legal parent and thus
liable for child support.162 As discussed earlier, many state statutes
require that a licensed physician perform the AI in order for pater-
nity rules to be enforced.163 In one case, Jhordan C. v. Mary K., the
court awarded paternity rights to a man who had provided sperm to
inseminate an acquaintance.164 The woman performed the insem-
ination at home, in violation of the state statute that required a
licensed physician to perform the AI, so she could not rely on the
statute to extinguish the donor’s parental rights because the statute
applied only if the semen was inseminated by a licensed physi-
cian.165 This rule has enormous implications for free, private sperm
donation because the AI is usually self-administered by the woman
who is often unmarried. If the parties fail to involve a doctor, they
may have no statutory remedies, and many courts may enforce
parental liability on the sperm donor. 
b. Distinction Between Known and Anonymous Donors 
When a woman decides to self-inseminate with the sperm of a
donor she found through a matching website, she also runs the risk
that courts will apply the distinction between known and unknown
162. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
164. 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 397 (1986). 
165. Id. 
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sperm donors that has been prominent in the case law.166 Many
courts are reluctant to deny parental rights to known sperm donors
if they request them due to the societal preference for two-parent
families, as opposed to single parents.167 Courts would most likely
classify donors who offer their sperm for free on sites like KDR as
known donors because they usually meet the recipient in person
and, in many cases, allow ongoing, albeit limited, contact with the
child. In this sense, they are more like directed donors than anon-
ymous donors.168 AI statutes do not expressly distinguish between
anonymous and known donors, leading to complications when a
woman uses a known donor. Intent is not as easily discernible for
known donors as it is for anonymous donors, and the parties in-
volved typically fail to adequately articulate their expectations prior
to conception. 
For example, in Thomas S. v. Robin Y., the court awarded pater-
nity rights to a known sperm donor who had formed a limited
relationship with the conceived child and never signed a written
agreement relinquishing his paternal rights.169 In reversing the
lower court’s decision, the appellate court said that “[t]he notion
that a lesbian mother should enjoy a parental relationship with [the
child], but a gay father should not is so innately discriminatory as
to be unworthy of comment.”170 The court effectively determined
that the sperm donor’s due process rights trumped what had been
determined to be the best interest of the child by both the lower
court and the court-appointed psychologist.171 Most sperm banks
provide protection for exactly this situation through anonymity
contracts, but part of the appeal of private donation is the possibility
166. See, e.g, C.O. v. W.S., 64 Ohio Misc. 2d at 11 (“The statute does not prevent a paternity
adjudication where an unmarried woman solicits the participation of the donor, who was
known to her, and where the donor and woman agree that there would be a relationship
between the donor and child.” (citations omitted)). But see Leckie v. Voorhies, 875 P.2d 521,
522 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (finding known donor not entitled to legal recognition of paternity
because he agreed not to assert paternity); McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239, 241, 243 (Or.
Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the statute applies even when a physician does not perform
insemination, the donor is not anonymous, and the recipient is unmarried). 
167. See CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 134, at 140; see also supra note 166. 
168. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text. 
169. 618 N.Y.S.2d 356, 362 (App. Div. 1994). 
170. Id. at 361.
171. Id. at 358, 362.
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of the sperm donor maintaining a limited relationship with the
child.
c. Written Agreements Are Important, but Not Necessarily
Dispositive
 Even when the parties agree on parenthood ahead of time,
contracts that explicitly preclude rights for known sperm donors are
not necessarily enforceable; courts may choose to invalidate these
agreements on public policy grounds concerning the best interests
of the child.172 Some states recognize a donor’s paternal rights only
when he intends to become a parent to a resulting child or stipulates
to such a right in written agreements,173 but most states do not
address this issue at all.
State courts have been inconsistent when enforcing the validity
of prior oral or written agreements.174 If a court finds that the sperm
donor made an oral agreement with the recipient that he will have
an active, decision-making role in the child’s life with visitation
rights—even if such an agreement is contrary to a statute—in many
such cases the court will grant him custody so as not to violate his
due process rights.175 In McIntyre v. Crouch, an Oregon sperm donor
successfully challenged an Oregon statute that cut off parent-child
rights and responsibilities between sperm donors and their off-
spring.176 The donor claimed that he donated sperm to a lesbian
172. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 682 (Cal. 2005).
173. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-703 (West 2012) (stating that if a sperm donor
intends to parent a child resulting from AI, he is the legal parent); D.C. CODE § 16-909(e)(2)
(2012) (stating that a sperm donor is the legal father if there is a written agreement between
him and the mother stating his intent to parent); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1114(f) (West 2012)
(same). 
174. Compare K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d at 682 (holding that a private contract could not cut
off parental rights), with In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) (holding that a
private contract that allows for parental rights could be enforced, overriding a state statute
that cuts off parental rights). Although both courts found in favor of parental rights, they
treated the parties’ private contracts inconsistently. See also State Dep’t of Human Servs. ex
rel. K.A.G. v. T.D.G., 861 P.2d 990, 991 (Okla. 1993) (ruling that an unwed mother could not
release the natural father of paternity rights, despite an agreement between the parties to
the contrary, due to public policy concerns as to the best interests of the child).
175. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. McDonald, Note, Sperm Donor or Thwarted Father? How
Written Agreement Statutes Are Changing the Way Courts Resolve Legal Parentage Issues in
Assisted Reproduction Cases, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 340, 344 (2009).
176. 780 P.2d 239, 245 (Or. Ct. App. 1989). 
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couple on the condition that he be allowed to retain contact with the
child.177 The court found that the law as applied to him could
unfairly and unconstitutionally deprive him of fathering rights and
that he should have the opportunity to prove any expectation of a
parenting role between himself and the mother.178
A distinguishing case, however, is In re K.M.H., in which the
Kansas Supreme Court was highly deferential to a state statute
that created a presumption that the sperm donor had no parental
rights, despite his expectations to the contrary, if there was no
written contract granting him such rights.179 In the case, the mother
brought a children-in-need-of-care petition against her sperm donor,
seeking a declaration from the court that the donor was an “unfit”
parent and asking for termination of his parental rights.180 The
donor requested a declaration of paternity and joint custody of the
child.181 He argued that he and the mother had an oral agreement
before the birth that he would be involved in the child’s life.182 The
issue before the court was a matter of first impression, and the court
ultimately decided that Kansas’s statute barring a presumption of
paternity for sperm donors absent a written agreement to the
contrary did not violate his equal protection or due process rights.183 
In a Pennsylvania case, the existence of an oral contract protected
the donor from a claim for child support. In Ferguson v. McKiernan,
a woman was inseminated with the sperm of a known donor
through a private donation made at a clinic.184 The donor and
mother initially agreed that he would relinquish visitation rights in
exchange for her agreeing to not seek child support; however, the
mother sought child support five years later.185 The lower court
initially found in her favor, applying the generally established rule
that an individual cannot contract away child support obligations.186
177. Id. at 241.
178. Id. at 245.
179. 169 P.3d 1025, 1043 (Kan. 2007); see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1114(f) (West 2012).
180. In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d at 1029. 
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1033.
183. Id. at 1031, 1033, 1040-41.
184. 940 A.2d 1236, 1238 (Pa. 2007).
185. Id.
186. Ferguson v. McKiernan, 60 Pa. D. & C.4th 353, 363-64 (Ct. C.P. 2002), aff'd, 855 A.2d
121 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004), rev'd, 940 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2007).
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, reversed and ruled that
the contract was enforceable, finding that the insemination in this
case was equivalent to an anonymous donation, and the donor
should be protected from claims for support.187
Even more recently, and perhaps most relevant to free, private
sperm donation, a New Mexico court found that an agreement be-
tween a woman and a known sperm donor releasing the donor of
child support obligations was unenforceable because the contract
allowed for the donor to assume a parental role in the child’s life.188
In Mintz v. Zoernig, a man provided sperm to a female friend, who
inseminated herself without the assistance of a licensed physi-
cian.189 Following the child’s birth, the donor and woman agreed in
writing that the donor would act as a male role model for the child,
that the mother and her partner were to be the primary parents,
and that the donor would have no financial obligations for child
support.190 The mother, however, eventually filed a paternity action,
seeking child support.191 The AI statute removing sperm donor pa-
rental rights and responsibilities did not apply because a physician
was not involved in the insemination.192 Additionally, because the
donor had held himself out to be the father of the child, the court
found that the contract was not enforceable and the donor should
therefore assume the legal responsibilities of parenthood.193 
These and similar cases suggest that courts are becoming more
inclined to reject arguments that known donation and single
motherhood are against public policy.194 However, they also raise
questions about whether agreements between single women or
married couples and private sperm donors, without the protection
of a statute, would be unenforceable. Free, private sperm donors
generally allow recipients to remain in contact with them and
sometimes even allow visitation with their conceived child. This
187. Ferguson, 940 A.2d at 1248.
188. Mintz v. Zoernig, 198 P.3d 861, 864 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008).
189. Id. at 862.
190. Id.
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 863.
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., L.A.L. v. D.A.L., 714 So. 2d 595, 596-97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (per
curiam) (refusing to grant parental rights to a known donor due to the prior agreement he had
made with the intended parents to relinquish all rights).
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contact is very limited, however, and would not be nearly as
substantial as the relationship that formed between father and child
in Mintz. 
d. Decreasing Reliance on Biology to Determine Paternity 
The law is increasingly recognizing factors other than biological
connections, such as “de facto” parenthood, in determining parental
rights.195 The father’s biological tie may not be dispositive, as courts
are placing increasing emphasis on established and intended
parenting relationships, in part to deal with the expanding defini-
tion of “family.” In a series of four cases, the “unwed father cases,”196
the Supreme Court developed a test that relied on three factors to
help determine whether an unwed man had the constitutional right
to become the legal father: “[His] biological relation to the child; his
social relationship to the child; and his relation to the child’s
mother.”197 The Court proclaimed that unwed fathers could become
legal fathers if they established meaningful familial relationships
with their biological children.198 Claims of parental rights by natural
fathers of illegitimate children are given constitutional respect when
those fathers have participated in the child’s maintenance and care.
Therefore, under the Court’s “biology plus relationship” standard,199
a free, private sperm donor whose only connection to the child is his
DNA could potentially be denied his ability to successfully assert
paternity. 
195. See Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419, 437 (Wis. 1995) (recognizing a parent-like
relationship that was not based on biology). 
196. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 119-30 (1989) (upholding a statutory presump-
tion of a child’s legitimacy, irrebuttable by all but the marital couple, therefore refusing a
natural father’s claim of rights both to prove his paternity and to maintain a relationship with
his daughter); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261-62 (1983) (ruling that biological
fatherhood is an important interest that deserves some protection, but that protection does
not immediately translate to legal fatherhood if an unwed biological father failed to develop
a relationship with the child); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254-55 & n.14 (1978) (holding
that the biological father failed to develop a “legitimate” relationship with his child); Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972) (holding that an unwed father has a due process right to
an individualized fitness assessment during a custody challenge).
197. JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND REPRODUCTION IN
AN UNEASY AGE 118 (1997). 
198. Id. 
199. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
429, 433 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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B. A New Notion of Family
The judiciary has begun to respond to and recognize the evolving
face of the American family, even if legislatures have been less
reluctant to embrace these changes.200 As private donor insemina-
tion becomes more widely used by single women and same-sex
couples, disputes will inevitably arise concerning the rights and
obligations of the donors absent clear legal definitions of parenthood
for intended parents—a problem exacerbated by the mobility of
individuals and families and the inconsistency among state laws.
Free, private sperm donation poses unique legal problems due to the
limited relationships many donors maintain with their children and
the fact that many states’ statutes do not protect unmarried women
or self-insemination.201 Although recent decisions indicate that
courts are more accepting of nontraditional families than they once
were,202 the lack of predictability on this issue illustrates the need
for uniform legislation that addresses the modern procedures and
parties involved, rather than outdated methods of conception.203 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. How to Resolve Paternity Issues When Using Free, Private
Sperm Donation
The inconsistency and variation among state statutes carry a
steep price.204 AI is a riskier process than it needs to be for intending
parents, who do not know if their written agreements are fully
enforceable;205 it is even riskier for a donor, who may be financially
liable if a mother tries to seek child support from him.206 These risks
could be reduced at either the federal or state level, or ideally
through a combination of both. Limited federal regulation that
addresses the rights of the sperm donor would be most proper.
200. See supra Part III.A.1.
201. See supra Part III.A.3.
202. CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 134, at 36.
203. See id.
204. See McDonald, supra note 175, at 340-41.
205. See supra Part III.A.3.c.
206. See CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 134, at 45 (describing a South Dakota case awarding
child support to the mother in such an instance).
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Individual states would still be free to approach AI as their citizens
see fit, but their specific provisions would be grounded in a system
that would clarify when, and under what conditions, AI would be
permitted, and who is the legal parent of the conceived child. But if
federal action is not possible due to congressional inaction or
political concerns, then more certainty is needed at the state level.
Clearly, state legislatures can contribute to the development of this
area of law by drafting a comprehensive statutory framework of
rights and liabilities affecting all parties involved in AI. Courts have
even expressed their desire for such uniform legislation when
dealing with cases concerning assisted reproduction.207
Free, private sperm donation creates unique paternity and cus-
todial issues because of its lack of donor anonymity, its unregulated
status, and the limited contact many donors have with their
children.208 As the private donor industry grows, new legal safe-
guards need to be designed and implemented that remove parental
liability of donors while maintaining the possibility of limited
contact between donor and child. 
First, this Note supports a default rule in all states that would
remove all paternal rights and liability for all donors unless the
donor intends otherwise.209 The majority in Ferguson v. McKiernan
described the downside of presuming parental rights of the sperm
donor:
[I]t would mean that a woman who wishes to have a baby but is
unable to conceive through intercourse could not seek sperm
from a man she knows and admires, while assuring him that he
will never be subject to a support order and being herself
207. See, e.g., Prato-Morrison v. Doe, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509, 516 n.10 (Ct. App. 2002)
(“Whatever merit there may be to a fact-driven case-by-case resolution of each new issue,
some overall legislative guidelines would allow the participants to make informed choices and
the courts to strive for uniformity in their decisions.”); In re A.B., 818 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2004) (“We encourage the Indiana legislature to help us address this current social
reality by enacting laws to protect children who, through no choice of their own, find
themselves born into unconventional familial settings.”).
208. See supra Part III.A.3.
209. Some states have a similar default rule that presumes that a sperm donor is not the
legal parent of a conceived child. See supra note 152. Other scholars have also suggested or
supported such a default rule. See, e.g., Charles W. Adamson, Assisted Reproductive
Techniques: When Is Sperm Donor a Dad?, 8 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 279, 293-94
(2009). 
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assured that he will never be able to seek custody of the child....
[T]o protect herself and the sperm donor, that would-be mother
would have no choice but to resort to anonymous donation or
abandon her desire to be a biological mother, notwithstanding
her considered personal preference to conceive using the sperm
of someone familiar, whose background, traits, and medical
history are not shrouded in mystery.210
1. Model Statute
Additionally, a uniform model or law should be developed to
clarify the legal status of children born as a result of sperm donated
through one of the matching websites. In order to apply to free,
private sperm donation, this model statute would need to be gender
neutral, allow for AI by single women, and omit language requiring
a physician to be involved in the insemination process. It should
also clarify that it does not matter whether a donor is known or
anonymous. An example of a possible statute could read as follows:
MODEL STATUTE. RIGHTS OF DONORS TO ASSISTED REPRODUCTION
1. A donor is not the legal parent of a child conceived through
assisted reproduction and shall have no rights, obligations, or
interest with respect to the conceived child, except as provided
in Subsection (2) of this provision.
a. Donor is defined as an individual who provides eggs or
sperm used for assisted reproduction to a recipient, with
no intent to be the legal parent of the conceived child,
whether the donor is known or anonymous to the recipi-
ent. 
b. Assisted reproduction is defined as a method of causing
pregnancy other than sexual intercourse. 
2. The donor may be the legal parent of a child conceived
through assisted reproduction only if both parties execute a
signed, written agreement before the conception takes place,
indicating the donor’s intent to parent.211
210. 940 A.2d 1236, 1247 (Pa. 2007).
211. This language is based off of Article 7 of the amended 2002 UPA dealing with the
status of children conceived using artificial reproduction. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 701-
702 (amended 2002), 98 U.L.A. 355 (2000).
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The gender neutral terms in this model statute, which would
apply to both sperm and egg donors, afford room for flexibility and
reinterpretation, and embrace a rational, modern understanding of
family, parenthood, and parental rights. New parental rights and
definitions of “family” could be created precisely because of the flex-
ibility in the proposed law. Free, private sperm donors would be
protected from parental liabilities under this law because it creates
a default presumption against paternity and does not require that
a licensed physician perform the AI, nor that the recipient be
married. 
2. Enforcing Written Agreements
In the meantime, courts should presume written agreements
between recipients and donors concerning parental rights to be as
valid, binding, and enforceable as any other contract.212 Written
agreements protect reproductive intent and have the added advan-
tage of discouraging litigation, as individuals are more likely to
resolve familial issues privately.213 They also minimize misunder-
standings and maximize procreative liberty by allowing the parties
to make their own decision over such a fundamentally personal
matter.214 Professor Marjorie Schultz has advocated a contract-
based analysis to parental rights of those who utilize ART, urging
that “[w]ithin the context of artificial reproductive techniques, in-
tentions that are voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express and bar-
gained-for ought presumptively to determine legal parenthood.”215
Recent cases show that courts are slowly recognizing the principle
of contract between donors and recipients as a basis for establishing
212. The benefits of written agreements in child support cases have been well-documented
in the family law literature. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 175, at 350.
213. See id.
214. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998) (“Written agreements also provide
the certainty needed for effective operation of IVF programs.... Knowing that advance
agreements will be enforced underscores the seriousness and integrity of the consent process.
Advance agreements as to disposition would have little purpose if they were enforceable only
in the event the parties continued to agree.”).
215. Marjorie Maguire Schultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An
Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 323. 
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the resulting parenting relations, despite a biological connection
between the donor and child.216
When a woman uses sperm from a free, private sperm donor, she
should always enter into a formal written agreement beforehand
that documents her and the donor’s intentions and expectations of
the arrangement. Sound, signed agreements demonstrate intent and
minimize misunderstanding.217 The parties should agree at the
outset to the kind of relationship that would extend between them
and a conceived child. They could include a stipulation that allows
the donor to maintain some form of limited contact with the child,
but that stresses that this contact would not bestow paternal rights
on the donor. The written form should clearly state that it is
intended to be a binding agreement between the parties in the event
of their future disagreement. 
One criticism of enforcing written agreements is that it is inher-
ently unfair and improper to allow individuals to contract away
something as significant as legal parentage, especially if the unin-
tended parent decides later that he wants to be the father.218
Moreover, some critics argue that denying a biological father pater-
nity rights goes against centuries of parentage and adoption law and
leaves the determination of parentage unclear.219 Although this Note
argues that the intending parent or parents of children produced
from AI should be the only ones who can exercise parental rights,
and that contracts in which sperm donors waive their parental
rights should be enforceable, this would not preclude a court from
finding that the sperm donor has established the functional rela-
tionship of parenthood with any resulting child. This relationship,
however, exists apart from the biological connection. If states are
uneasy with letting individual parties form their own contract, the
law could provide that an AI arrangement requires prior court
approval before the initiation of the insemination, much like the
UPA recommends for surrogacy contracts.220 Another possibility to
216. See K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 681 (Cal. 2005) (holding that both the woman who
donated her ova and her lesbian partner who carried the child were the child’s parents); Elisa
B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 673 (Cal. 2005) (enforcing the obligation of a woman who
agreed to raise children with her lesbian partner to support those children). 
217. See McDonald, supra note 175, at 350.
218. CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 134, at 384. 
219. See id.
220. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 76-78 (2001). 
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help alleviate concerns could be the implementation of a mandatory
waiting period after a child is born, during which the donor could
rescind the agreement if he decides he does want a parental role in
the child’s life. Ultimately, the state’s paramount interest should be
the welfare of the child. 
CONCLUSION
Advances in technology, along with an increase in single and
same-sex parents, have resulted in a redefinition and broadening of
the “American family.”221 It is time that the legal system catches up
with the evolving medical possibilities and familial relationships of
the last fifty years.222 The Supreme Court has even acknowledged
this social change, stating that “[t]he demographic changes of the
past century make it difficult to speak of an average American
family.”223 
It is up to the law to turn all babies, and those who make them,
into legally recognized and legally protected families. The law must
delineate who has parental rights to what forms of genetic or social
offspring and under what conditions these rights can be effectively
extended. At the moment, courts and legislatures are struggling to
define and protect these new families and those who participate in
creating them.224 There is very little uniformity among states con-
cerning the laws of gamete donation. State statutes are particularly
discordant with defining family relationships established through
unconventional methods of conception, such as free, private sperm
donation.225
This Note has argued that free, private sperm donation fulfills a
valuable role in society by allowing individuals to become parents
who would otherwise not be able to have children of their own.
Public interests are best served by having a consistent, bright-line
rule concerning parental rights in cases of AI through free, private
221. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63-66 (2000).
222. Dr. Finegold made this very same point in his book, written almost fifty years ago, in
1964. FINEGOLD, supra note 13, at 64 (“The lag between the law and the scientific
achievement of artificial impregnation has irritated lawyers as well as physicians.”). 
223. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63. 
224. See CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 134, at 2. 
225. See McDonald, supra note 175, at 341.
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sperm donation, so that intended parents can be assured of uncon-
tested parenthood, sperm donors can be free of potential liability,
and the best interests of the conceived child can be protected.
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